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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES IN 
POST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA : THE QUESTION OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
Introduction 
Fifty years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
1948, both academics and non-academics alike still question the universality and 
validity of human rights principles. The questioning appears to have arisen in part 
from the persistent and gross violations of fundamental human rights in most part 
of the world. 
Some anti-human rights activists are of the opinion that the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights is a successful failure while human rights advocates are of the 
view that the declaration has achieved some level of success. 
The reasons often advanced by the anti-human rights activists as evidence of the 
abysmal failure of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights revolve around the 
global increase in the constant violation of human rights and the degrading 
treatment of human beings in our society. These anti-human rights activists often 
attribute these violations to a wide and complex variety of factors and forces 
which include among others, economic conditions, structural social factors and 
political expediency. 
According to Abdullahi Ahmed An N aim 1 lack or insufficiency of cultural 
legitimacy of human rights standard is one of the main underlying causes of 
violation of those human rights standards. His contention is that there is need to 
1 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nairn, 'Towards a cross-cultural approach to defining international standards of 
Human rights : The meaning of cruel, inhwnan or degrading treatment or punishment' in Human Rights 
in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest/or Consensus. (1992) pp 19-33. 
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advance the universal legitimacy of human rights by addressing some of the 
difficulties facing cross-cultural analysis and by examining some of its specific 
implication. To the extent that the search for universal legitimacy of human rights 
through cross-cultural analysis and reinterpretation is accepted as a useful 
approach to enhancing the credibility and efficacy of an international standard. He 
argues further that after the above analysis, the remaining challenge is to develop 
the appropriate methodology for identifying and pursuing the standards goals. In 
the new constitution of South Africa, human rights principles have been 
entrenched under the Bill of Rights. As a matter of fact, the Bill of Rights was 
inscribed in the constitution to safeguard human rights principles. The Bill of 
Rights is described by the constitution itself as the "cornerstone of democracy in 
South Africa". 
In view of the importance attached to human rights principles as embedded in the 
Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution, this paper attempts to examine 
critically those areas where South Africa has successfully implemented human 
rights in terms of the international standard. In the same vein, an attempts will be 
made to discuss those areas where it will be difficult to achieve the international 
standard. In considering the implementation of human rights principles, the first 
clause that comes to our mind is that of human dignity. With regards to human 
dignity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that "no one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment". This is a very important clause mainly because it affects every 
society and also because inhuman treatment or punishment is prohibited by 
regional instruments, such as the European convention for the protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as under the international 
system of the United Nations. 
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However, for a full understanding of this clause and how it has been implemented 
in South Africa, it is necessary for us to review the clause as stipulated by the 
United Nations. 
The meaning of The Clause in the United Nations Perspective 
In terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the General 
Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration as "a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constant in mind, shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms by 
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of territories under 
their jurisdiction". 
Article 5 of this declaration stipulates that "no one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Both human rights 
treaties and customary international law prohibit torture and impose obligations on 
Governments to prevent and punish acts of torture2• The Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines 
torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5, ICCPR, Article 7; Convention Against Torture and 
other Crue~ Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention). The discussion of 
Nigel Rodley, Treatment a/prisoners under international law, (1987), pp 63-65. Oxford University Press. 
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consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in official 
capacity3". Under this definition, State agents and individuals who are found to 
have dealt with other human beings in a manner that is inhuman are held liable for 
torture, cruel and degrading treatment. 
Using the definition contained this Article as background, we now proceed to 
assess how the courts in South Africa have implemented this Article of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Chapter two of the South African 
Constitution deals with the Bill of Rights and Section 10 of the Bill of Rights deals 
with Human dignity. This section states that ''Everyone has inherent dignity and 
the right to have their dignity respected and protected". The right to human 
dignity in this section can be regarded as one of the core constitutional rights 
since the Bill of Rights must be interpreted so as to promote the constitutional 
desire to create an open and democratic society which is functionally based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The issue of Dignity and Punishment 
In the case of S v William4, five different cases in which six juveniles were 
convicted by different magistrates and sentenced to receive a 'moderate 
correction' of a number of strokes with a light cane, was brought into convention. 
The issue in this case was whether the sentence of juvenile whipping, pursuant to 
be provisions of section 294 of the South African Criminal Procedure Act5 is , 
consistent with the provisions of the constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
3 See the details in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention). 
4 S V William (1995)3 South African Law Report, 632 (cc). 
5 See Act 51 of 1977 (as amended). For convenience, this will be referred to simply as 'the Act'. 
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with regard to Chapter Two 6. The applicants in this case are all males and they are 
juveniles. Three of them, namely, Williams, Koopman and Mampa, were each 
sentenced to suspended prison sentences in addition to the juvenile whipping. The 
remaining three were sentenced to juvenile whipping only. 
The Provincial Division of the Supreme Court saw the matters in two ways : all 
the cases were subject to automatic review in terms of section 302(1)(a) of the Act 
because of the terms of imprisonment, albeit suspended, imposed on the applicants 
themselves. 
In addition to this automatic review, Mr A P Dippenaar, who presided over the 
case involving Williams, requested that the sentence of strokes be subjected to 
special review in terms of Section 304(4) of the Act. He took this step because he 
doubted whether juvenile whipping was still permissible in the light of the new 
Constitution and in view of the decision in Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia : 
In recorporal Punishment By Organs of State? Whether, as a matter of strict law, 
the magistrate was correct in deferring the execution of the whipping8 is not an 
issue. He deserves to be commended for treating as a matter of priority an issue 
involving fundamental human rights and, in particular, the application of the 
provisions of Chapter 2 of the present constitution. A sentence of juvenile 
6 See Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights) of the present constitution of South Africa, as amended on 11 October 1996 
by the Constitutional Assembly. 
7 (1991) 3 South African Law Rep01176 (NmS). 
8 In S V Pretorius (1987) 2 South African Law Report 250 (NC) it was held that, where a magistrate has, in 
terms of Section 294 of the Act, sentenced a juvenile offender to a whipping, and has conjoined a sentence 
which is subject to automatic review to the whipping, the magistrate does not have the jurisdiction to 
suspend the infliction of the whipping pending the result of the review. This case might of course be 
distinguishable on the basis that what is at issue here, and what is sought to be reviewed, is the sentence of 
whipping. 
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whipping in tenns of section 294 of the Act is not nonnally reviewable
9
; the 
whipping is therefore administered immediately after sentence is passed. There 
are countless instances in the past where courts sitting on appeal or review have 
had to set aside sentences imposed by trial courts because of irregularities; where 
those offenders had been sentenced to a juvenile whipping, the punishment would 
almost invariably have been carried out already. Once a whipping has been 
administered, as in this William' s case, any decision which this court comes to 
will make no practical difference to them for purposes of the present proceedings. 
Mindful of this, Mr Dippenaar who presided over the case ordered that the 
sentence of five strokes imposed by him on the applicant Williams should not be 
carried out until the issue, whether or not the punishment was consistent with the 
constitution, had been finally decided by the Constitutional Court. The case was 
therefore referred to the Constitutions Court. 
The Constitutional Court held the provisions of Section 294 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, which provide for juvenile whipping as a sentencing option, 
violated ss10 (human dignity) and 11(2) (cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment) and could not be saved by the operation of Section 33. The issue was 
to a large extent rendered academic since the state, which had originally argued 
that corporal punishment was constitutional, had subsequently accepted the 
unconstitutionality of this sentencing option. Argument on the issue was, 
however, presented in the COurtlO. 
Langa J, delivering the unanimous judgement of the constitutional court, referred 
to the growing consensus in the international community that judicial whipping 
9 Cf Steve Pete "To smack or not to smack? Should the law prohibit South Mrican parents from imposing 
corporal punishment on their children" (1998)3 South African Journal on Human Rights 443. 
10 (1995) 3 South Africa Law Report 632 (CC)(1995)3 South African Criminal Report 251 (4). 
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offends society's notions of decency and is a direct invasion of the right which 
evety person has to human dignity. In attempting to convince the court that 
juvenile whipping was a justified infringement of various rights, it was argued by 
the state that juvenile whipping had advantages for both the offender and the state, 
especially in the light of limited resources and the infrastructure for implementing 
the other sentencing options, and that it acted as a deterrent. 
However, Langa, 1., disagreed with this line of reasoning and the logic, by 
drawing our attention to other more enlightened sentencing options (such as 
correctional supervision and community service orders). He was of the opinion 
that no clear evidence had been advanced that juvenile whipping is a more 
effective deterrent than any other available fonns of punishment. The provisions 
of Section 294 of the Criminal Procedures Act, therefore, impose limits on the 
rights contained in ss10 and 11(2) which are unreasonable, unjustifiable and 
unnecessary11. 
In this case the constitutional court held that the measures that assail the dignity 
and self-esteem of an individual will have to be justified ; there is no place for 
brutal and dehumanising treatment and punishment. The constitution has 
allocated the State and its organs a role as the protectors and guarantors of those 
rights to ensure that they are available to all. In the process, it sets the State up as 
a model for society, as it endeavours to move away from a violent past. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that the State must be foremost in upholding those 
values which are the guiding light of civilised societies. Respect for human 
dignity is one of such values; acknowledging it includes an acceptance by society 
that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human 
dignity. The above statement is a confmnation of the support on validation given 
11 1. Burchell and J. Milton, Principles of Criminal Law (1997), pp 54-56. 
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by the South African Constitutional Court to the principles of Human Rights as 
clearly stated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
In the case of State vs. Makwanyane 12 two appellants had been convicted in a 
Local Division on inter alia, four counts of murder and on each count they had 
been sentenced to death. They made an appeal against the convictions and 
sentences but the court on appeal held that there was no merit in the appeals 
against the convictions. As regards the death sentences it was contended on behalf 
of the appellants that the imposition of the death sentences was unconstitutional by 
virtue of the provisions of section 9 or section 11(2) in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, which came into 
effect on 27 April 1994. The court was of the opinion that the death sentences 
were in the circumstances of the case, the proper sentences and that it was possible 
that section 241(8) of the constitution authorised the court to confirm a death 
sentence even though it might be in conflict with the constitution : the court was 
however doubtful whether the Appellate Division had the power to interpret 
section 241 (8), but, even if it did it would be better first to obtain the decision of 
the Constitutional Court concerning the validity of the death sentencel3 ; and that 
was a question in respect of which, in terms of section 101(5), read with section 
98(2), of the Constitution, only the Constitutional Court had jurisdiction. The 
court accordingly ordered that further consideration on the issue of death sentence 
must be referred to the Constitutional Court. 
In the Constitutional Court, Chaskalson, P (president of the Constitutional Court) 
delivering the principal judgement of the Constitutional Court drew attention to 
12 S tate v Makwanyane and others. 1995(2) South African Criminal Report l(cc). 
13 Cf PM Maduna "The death penalty and Human Rights" (1995)11 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 193. 
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the fact that the death penalty is inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading 
punishment. He argues that the imposition of the death penalty was arbitrary and 
unequal in its operation and constituted an impairment of human dignity. 
According to Chaskalson, P, section 277(I)a of the Criminal Procedure Act
14
, 
which provided for the imposition of the death penalty for murder conflicted with 
section 11(2) which prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and such 
infringement of section 11(2) was not justified in terms of section 33. 
Separate judgements, all concumng with that of Chaskalson P, that capital 
punishment was unconstitutional, were delivered by all the other 10 Constitutional 
Court Justices 1 5. Ackennann is of the view that life imprisonment may be the 
14 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
15 For example, in Ackermann J's Judgement, in emphasising the inevitably arbitrary nature of the decision 
to impose the death penalty, held that it infringed both the right not to be subjected to cruel and inhuman 
punishment in section 11 and the right in section 9 and that such infringement could not be rescued by 
section 33. With regards to Didcott J's judgement, he argues that capital punishment violated section 9 and 
sI1(2) and may even renate the essential content of section 9, but considered it prudent not to pronounce on 
whether the essential content of the right had been negated He agreed with Chaskalson, P, that the 
question was not whether the death penalty had a deterrent effect, but whether its dererent effect happens to 
be significantly greater than that of the alternative sentence available. In Kriegler J's judgement, he 
concluded that capital punishment was inconsistent with section 9 and located the right to life at the 
pinnacle of the constitutionally protected rights. In terms of Langa 1's judgement, he emphasised the 
Concept ofubuntu as incorporating the protection of the right to life and dignity, also regarded the 
imposition of capital punishment as infringing on human rights to life. In Madala's judgement, he pointed 
out clearly that death penalty conflicted not only with the concept of ubuntu but also with Section 11. In 
Mohamed's judgement, he was of the view that the imposition of death penalty prima facie infringed the 
right to life, equality (58), dignity (510) and was cruel, inhuman and degrading. Mokgoro J, in delivering 
her judgement, regarded the imposition of capital punishment as an affront to tbe right to life and dignity 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. She regarded the imposition of the death penalty as violating 
the essential content of the right to life. O'Regan, J, in her judgement was of the view that the imposition 
of capital punishment constituted a breach of section 9, section 10 and section 11 (2) of the Constitution. 
She placed tlle right to life in a tmamount position and gave it a broad meaning which incorporated the 
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necessary trade-off for the abolition of capital punishment in order to protect 
society from seriously harmful conduct. 
Generally speaking, it appears that all the 11 judges on the Constitutional Court in 
State v Makwanyane16 agreed that the imposition of capital punishment 
unjustifiably infringed Section 11(2). Justices Ackermann, Didcott, Kriegler, 
Langa, Mohamed, Mokgoro, 0 'Regan and Sachs respectively held that death 
sentence unjustifiably infringed section 9 and section 10 of the new South African 
Constitution 17 
The Constitutional Court did well by holding firmly to the fact that death penalty 
is a gross violation of an individual's right to life. The decision of the 
Constitutional Court on this case is compatible with the International Standard on 
human dignity. As a matter of fact, the judgement is quite laudable in light of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In most civilised society, the death 
penalty is regarded as cruel, inhuman and degrading. 
Historically, it can still be recalled that the mam factor that motivated the 
entrenchment of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration ~f Human Rights was to 
prevent the re-occurrence of atrocities such as those committed in concentration 
right to dignity. In Sachs 1's judgement, he placed emphasis on the right to life as well as the right to 
dignity. Like some of the other judges, he also emphasised the need to take into account the values of 
South African Society, in particular the idea of African Philosophy of ubuntu. With regard to Didcott 1's 
judgement, he argues that capital punishment violated section 9 and S 11 (s) and may even renate the 
essential content of section 9, but considered it prudent not to pronounce on whether the essential content 
of the right had been negated. He agreed with Chaskalson P, that the question was not whether the death 
penalty had a deterrent effect, but whether its different effect happens to be significantly greater than that of 
the alternative sentence available. 
16 State v Makwanyane. 1995(2). South African Criminal Report 1 (cc). 
17 1. Burchell and J Milton, op cit pp 49-56. 
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camps during the Second World War. Having discussed the implementation of 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the context of South 
African Courts, we will now examine Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
Article 17 states that : 
i) Every one has right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others; 
ii) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
The issue under assessment in this discussion is to find out the extent or otherwise 
to which South African Courts have been successful in implementing Article 17. 
Section 25 of the South African Bill of Rights includes the property clause. This 
clause protects individual rights to property and it embraces three broad categories 
of right claims, namely : 
a) Claim to an immunity against uncompensated expropriation of 
private property by the State. This buttresses the fact that the State 
cannot lawfully take over property unless it pays for it. 
b) Claim of right to hold property. This is supported by Article 17 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "Everyone has the right 
to own property alone as well as in the association with others". 
c) Claim to have property. The main argument here is that all people 
have a moral right to have at least enough property to enable them to 
live. It is state responsibility to at least provide minimum comfort 
for everybody. 
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Section 25 of the Bill of Rights shows that the Property Clause embraces the real 
rights recognized by the law of property, rights such as ownership, mineral rights, 
servitude etc. It includes the right to use something and exclude others from it, the 
rights to transfer something to another and the right to instruct another person not 
to use his property like a trade mark, on ideas and/or an invention (Intellectual 
property). 
In this paper, we intend to examine the issue of intellectual property to evaluate 
how successful the courts in South Africa have protected the use of intellectual 
property to conform with the international standard. 
One of the most recent court cases we shall examine is that of Joburgers and Dax 
Prop cc vs. McDonald18• The facts of this case are as follows : In South Africa, 
McDonald was the registered proprietor of various trademark among which are 
McDonald, Big Mac, and Golden Arches Devile (the "McDonald's trade marks"). 
These various trade marks were registered in 1968, 1974, 1979 and 1985. In 1993 
Joburgers Drive Inn Restaurant (Pty) Limited (Joburgers) filed an application for 
the expungement of the above trade marks simply because at the time of 
registration, McDonald had no bona fide use thereof for the five years period 
proceeding the date of the application for expungement. 
MacDonald vehemently opposed Joburgers application. Joburgers went further to 
indicate his interest in using the McDonald' s trade marks. In view of this, 
McDonald immediately launched an urgent application in the Supreme Court 
against Joburgers for an injunction so as to stop Joburgers from using McDonald's 
trade marks. At this point in time, the Supreme Court was said to have granted a 
18 See South African Trade Marks Act of 1993, page 12. 
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temporary injunction in favour of McDonald waiting for the outcome of the 
1· . 19 expungement app lcatIon . 
In 1994, Dax Prop cc (Dax) filed applications against McDonald's trade marks 
and brought an application before the Supreme Court for the expungement of the 
McDonald's trade marks on the same grounds as Joburgers. On the other hand, 
McDonald brought a counter-claim for trade mark infringement. 
It is interesting to note the main defenses raised by McDonald in both cases. In 
the first defense, McDonald argued that at all material time relevant it always had 
a bona fide intention to use its trade marks in South Africa. In the second defense, 
McDonald relied on the Trade Marks Act no 62 of 1963 condoning the non-use of 
a trade mark where such non-use was due to special circumstances in the trade. 
McDonald made it clear that the American Anti Apartheid Legislation against 
South Africa amounted to such circumstances. 
On 1st of May 1995, South Africa promulgated a new Trade Marks Act, No 194 of 
1993. Section 35 of this Act makes a provision for the protection of ''well known" 
foreign trade marks so as to help South Africa conform with article 6 bis of the 
Paris Convention (International Standard in Protection of individual property). In 
view of this article, McDonald brought a further application for an injunction 
against Joburgers and Dax Prop from using the trade marks of Macdonald for the 
fact that McDonald as a trade marks was a "well known" foreign trade mark in 
South Africa. 
19 Cf A J van der Walt "Double property guarantees: A structurnl and comparative analysis" (1998)4 
South African Journal on Human Rights 561. 
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Unfortunately the decision of Court a quo was not favourable to McDonald for 
various reasons advanced by the Court. One of such reasons was that McDonald 
did not prove to the satisfaction of the Court that its trade marks were "well 
known" in South Africa. In view of this judgement by Court a quo, McDonald 
appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The Appellate 
Division's interpretation of Section 35 (well known) was quite different from that 
of the court a quo. The Appellate Division pointed out that South Africa had 
followed the "hard line approach" in passing-off proceedings in which it was 
necessary to establish, in addition to a reputation, a good will in South Africa 
before a claim in respect of passing-off could be found. The court went further to 
buttress the fact that section 35 was enacted for the purpose of protecting foreign 
trade marks which had a reputation in South Africa but had not yet established a 
good will in South Africa by commencing business. 
The second point emphasised by the Court was that section 35 remedied the fact 
that South African common law as set out above did not enable South Africa to 
meet its international obligation and at the same time conform with article 6 bis of 
the Paris Convention. These were the factors considered by the Appellate 
Division in interpreting the concept of "well known". 
The Appellate court disagreed with the judgement of the court a quo after 
advancing its own reason and ruled in favour of McDonald. This final judgement 
by the Appellate Division removed the International Stigma that was already 
placed on South Africa that it does not respect Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in terms of both the rights for an individual to own 
property and not to be arbitrarily deprived ofhislher property. In addition to this, 
this judgement of the Appellate Division finally put to rest the other international 
criticism that South Africa does not fulfil its obligations under Article 6 bis of the 
Paris Convention by not protecting ''well known" international trade marks. 
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This fmal judgement of the Appellate Division confrrms that South Africa courts 
have achieved some level of success in the implementation of Human Rights 
Principles in tenus of the International Standards. From our discussions so far we 
have shown those situations where South African courts have achieved 
international standards in implenlenting Human Rights Principles. However, there 
are situations where it will be difficult to achieve international standards. These 
situations will now be the focus of the remaining part of this paper. 
Situations where it will be difficult to achieve the 
International Standard 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 
supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and requires State respect for 
the culture and language of the people. Article 27 states as follows : 
"In those states in which ethnic, religions or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language". This Article 27 agrees with 
s30 and 31 of the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution. s30 and 31 
accords rights to members of cultural, linguistic and religious communities to 
participate in their culture, language and religions with other members of the 
community. In summary, s30 and 31 of the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution provides as follows : 
Section 30 
Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of 
their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
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Section 31(1) 
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be 
denied the right, with other members of that community : 
a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language ; 
and 
b) to fo~ Jom and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society. 
c) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Having summarized some of the issues in the Bill of Rights we will now examine 
the implementation of Human Rights Principles in light of the custommy marriage 
of the people of South Africa which of course is based on their cultural beliefs and 
values. Before custommy marriage can be approved by the family members of the 
bride the bridewealth (lobolo) must be paid by the family members of the 
bridegroom. According to Schapera, L 20, the main function of the payment of 
lobolo is to transfer the reproductive power of a woman from her family to that of 
her husband. He argues that this fact is of considerable importance, for upon it 
rests the whole concept of legitimacy of the customary marriage. 
Hollerman, F ,D21. sees the payment of lobolo as an undertaking by a husband and 
his family to deliver a specified number of cattle or other compensation, which 
20 L. Schapera, Tribal Legislation among the Tswana of the Bechuamaland Protectorate, Monographs on 
SodalAnthropology. No 9 (1943). 
21 F D Hollennan. The recognition of Ban tu Customary Law in South Africa (1955). Leiden University 
Press, pp35-47 
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will enable the husband to obtain a wife for their own procreation. He points out 
clearly that these obligations intended by the parties cannot therefore be regarded 
as fully achieved until the full amount of marriage compensation agreed upon has 
been delivered. 
According to Bekker, J.C.22, lobolo is the rock on which the customary marriage is 
founded. He argues that there is considerable justification for the view that lobolo 
contract has a greater binding force than a marriage at common law. From my 
personal observation, the principal aim of lobolo is to create a life long conjugal 
association. In view of the significance of the payment of lobolo before a 
customary marriage can be recognised, we decided to interview 70 female 
respondents about their opinions on the payment of lobolo in terms of human 
dignity. We solicited this information through the help of questionnaires and oral 
interviews. 
The result of the interview shows that 60% of the respondents are of the view that 
the amount paid on 'lobolo' must be reduced, 33% are of the view that 'lobolo' 
must be abolished and 7% are of the view that it must be left intact. The general 
opinion of those respondents who felt it should be abolished was based on the fact 
that in the process of negotiation on how much 'lobolo' is to be paid on them, 
they are not only commodified at that point in time but it also affects their human 
dignity. 
Let us assume in view of the above feelings of the respondents, the Government of 
South Africa decides to constitutionally abolished the payment of 'lobolo'. Partly 
because it affects human dignity and mainly because it is not compatible with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in terms of Article 5. Then a problem 
22 J C Bekker, Customary Law in SouthAfrica (1989) Cape Town: Juta and Compmy. 
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arises with regards to section 15(3) of the South African Bill of Rights which 
provides that the legislature is not precluded from recognising certain marriages 
and systems of personal and family law. This confirms that any legislation to 
abolish 'lobolo' will be challenged on the basis of individual freedom to practice 
their beliefs system and the right of individual freedom of religion. 
Section 30 of the South African Bill of Rights which deals with the language and 
culture precludes the legislature from abolishing the payment of 'lobolo'. This 
section states that "everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in 
the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a 
manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights". 
Section 31 (1) and (2) also precludes the legislature from abolishing the payment of 
'lobolo'. This section clearly indicates that "persons belonging to a culturally 
religious and linguistic community may not be denied their rights, with other 
members of that community to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use 
their language". From our research findings, 7% of the respondents who are in 
support of the payment of 'lobolo' have the constitutional rights to challenge any 
legislation promulgated to abolish 'lobolo'. As far as these respondents are 
concerned, the payment of lobolo is part of their culture and it should be left 
intact. 
Apart from individuals challenging the abolishment of 'lobolo' the black 
communities at large can also challenge the legislature on the abolishment of 
'lobolo' . The black communities would argue that the abolishment has denied 
them their rights to practice their culture, by paying particular attention to s31 (1 ) 
and (2) of the constitution. 
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This particular problem has been identified recently by the South African Law 
Commission23. The Commission (SALC) made it clear that section 30 and 33 of 
the constitution allow individuals and groups the freedom to participate and pursue 
the cultme of their choice. Implicit in this freedom is the duty on the State to 
recognise their cultural institutions. In view of this, the Commission's 
recommendation was that in order to remove the anomalies created by many years 
of discrimination, customary marriage must now be fully recognised and legalised. 
To do so will comply with Section 9, 15, 30 and 31 of the Constitution provisions 
which suggest that the same effect be given to African cultmal institutions as to 
those of Western tradition. T.R. Bennett (1995)24 argues that the State's duty to 
respect African cultural institutions is, at the same time, matched by its obligation 
to uphold human rights. He suggested that in fonnulating policy towards 
marriage, the state should pay much attention to Article 16 of the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights and Acts 10 and 23 of the International Convenants on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights25. This would 
enable the State to make standard and universal policy towards securing the right 
to marry and practice the cultme of their choice. 
Unfortunately, the new South African Constitution does not recognise customary 
marriage and its institutions like polygamy and yet section 15(3)(a) of the Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution does not prevent the legislatme from recognising 
systems of personal and family law under any tradition. In this aspect, it can be 
argued that the South African constitution has not achieved international standard 
in tenns of section 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
requires State respect for culture and language of the people. 
23 SALC (1996) : Report Project 90 (22-23). 
24 T. w. Bennett, Human Rights and African Customary Law (1995), pp 28-33. 
25 Cf Anthony Costa "The Myth of Customary Law" (1998)14 South African Journal on Human Rights 
p.532. 
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There is urgent need for the South African Government to review and respect the 
culture of the people if it is to claim to have achieved an international standard in 
the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
It may still be recalled that section 30 of the Bill of Rights of South Africa states 
that everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice. 
This buttressed the fact that people have the right to practice customary marriage 
if they so desire and it must therefore be recognised and legalised. People often 
ask the question if this allows people to practice polygamy when this is considered 
as the culture of their choice. Of course, yes, if this is the individual's choice. As 
far as we are concerned any attempt not to recognise customary marriage and its 
institutions amounts to not implementing Section 27 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Some legal experts may argue that there are limitation clauses 
in which not all cultural values will be allowed. The question then arises to whose 
culture are we going to apply the limitation clause? Is it African culture or the 
Westem culture ?26 this question cannot be answered easily and because of this, 
there is urgent need for the South African Government to investigate on how best 
this problem of cultural diversity can be resolved before fully achieving any 
international standard in the implementation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
Conclusion 
The problem of cultural diversity is quite an urgent issue that needs to be resolved. 
In view of this, an attempt will be made here to recommend some measures that 
can be taken to minimize the above problem. 
26 er Anthony Costa. Ibid 
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In the ftrst place, I would suggest "internal negotiation settlement" between the 
different races of South Africa on their cultural differences. This process would 
involve reinterpretation and reconstruction of the different cultural values of the 
people. Racial group should come to a compromise on what they would accept 
among themselves. Culture itself is dynamic, it changes with the society. All the 
racial groups should be able to strike a balance and arrive at what suits the present 
situation if they are to achieve the International Standards in the implementation of 
Universal Human Rights. For one race or group of individuals to feel that their 
cultural values are superior to those of another is inhuman and a sweeping 
assumption. 
This 'internal negotiation settlement' is likely to encourage good will, mutual 
respect, equality with each other's culture and at the same time create a positive 
relationship among this different races. 
Finally, the ultimate goal of this 'internal negotiation settlement' is to agree on a 
body of beliefs to guide the action of the people. This is a necessary undertaking 
if an International Standard is to be achieved in the implementation of the 
Universal Human Rights Principles. 
